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“This affair is about something bigger 
than John Bright”: 
Iowans Confront the 
Jim Crow South, 1946–1951 
S ZEBULON BAKER 
ON OCTOBER 23, 1951, the members of the Drake University 
Athletic Council somberly convened in the office of their chair-
man, Professor Frank Gardner. Nearly 72 hours had passed since 
their football team arrived home after a defeat at Oklahoma 
A&M, only to be thrust into the national spotlight—not for the 
play of their All-America halfback, Johnny Bright, but for the in-
juries he sustained. On three successive plays in Drake’s first 
drive, A&M lineman Wilbanks Smith leveled him with high, 
hard blows to the face long after the ball had moved down field. 
By the time Drake tallied its first touchdown, Bright’s jaw was 
broken, sidelining him for the rest of the day and, as it happened, 
the entire season. Once Bright was out, Smith ceased his reck-
less tactics. If not for Des Moines Register photographers Don 
Ultang and John Robinson, who vividly captured the attack in 
photographs that indicated premeditation, the incident would 
likely have been waved off as another illustration that football 
is a violent sport.  
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This is one of a series of Pulitzer Prize–winning photos by Don Ultang 
and John Robinson showing Wilbanks Smith attacking Johnny Bright 
(wearing #43, in white) in the upper right corner of the photo while the 
ball carrier is in the lower center of the photo. From Don Ultang Collec-
tion, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City. 
 The irreducible fact that Bright was an African American 
rendered Smith’s hits far more than rough play. With the pho-
tographs plucked off wire services by newspapers in every 
corner of the country, those faculty members who composed 
Drake’s Athletic Council were faced with a full-blown crisis that 
grew by the hour as Smith and his head coach, J. B. Whitworth, 
issued repeated denials that Bright was targeted. As the coun-
cilmen gathered to watch the assault unfold on the game films, 
they knew that they had to counter such lies by giving voice to 
the truth the pictures already spoke. Because of his race, they 
asserted, “there was obvious intent to injure Bright with unnec-
essary roughness.”1
                                                 
1. Minutes of the Athletic Council, 10/23/1951, Folder “Bright, Johnny—Alum,” 
Drake Biography Files, Drake Heritage Collections, Cowles Library, Drake Uni-
versity, Des Moines (hereafter cited as DBF); Don Ultang, interview by Brian 
Thomas, 6/5/1999, Iowa Digital Library, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa 
City. On the Bright incident, see, generally, Jessica Lynn Schultz, “Moments of 
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 Before this game, it was an article of faith throughout Iowa 
that Bright—who had led the nation in rushing the previous two 
seasons as well as when he took the field on that sweltering Okla-
homa Saturday—was a virtual lock for the Heisman Trophy. 
The professors who winced as grainy footage showed him being 
slammed onto that same field had placed their faith in the belief 
that sport offered an arena for racial progress, where the compet-
itive rights of African Americans were guaranteed. Both dreams 
now seemed as shattered as Bright’s jaw. If anything, Smith ham-
mered home a warning from southern universities that they 
would not abandon Jim Crow in the postwar age without a fight. 
 The councilmen’s sullen silence as the projector rattled to a 
noisy stop registered the message as received. When they began 
to speak, the emotional tenor of their conversation betrayed a 
deep cynicism about whether the Missouri Valley Conference 
—of which Drake and A&M were members, joined by an equal 
split of integrated and segregated institutions—could preserve 
the openness of spirit that allowed Bright to participate in the 
first place.2 For the council, “A&M’s toleration of such con-
duct” indicated a retrenchment of old patterns that would hold 
black participation at bay, making sport yet another fortress in 
which Jim Crow found sanctuary. Ultang and Robinson’s pho-
tos peeked past the parapets, revealing a brutal defense of the 
competitive color line.3
                                                                                                       
Impact: Race, Injury, and Football History in Iowa’s Collective Memory” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Iowa, 2005); and Lane Demas, Integrating the Gridiron: Black 
Civil Rights and American College Football (New Brunswick, NJ, 2010), esp. chap. 4. 
Drake University’s Cowles Library maintains an outstanding digital archive 
on Johnny Bright and the Bright incident online as part of the Drake Heritage 
Collections; it can be accessed at www.lib.drake.edu/heritage/bright. 
2. During most of the period this article examines—roughly 1946 to 1951—the 
Missouri Valley Conference included, in addition to Drake and Oklahoma 
A&M, Bradley University and the Universities of Detroit and Wichita, which, 
like Drake, featured black players on their athletic teams; and Saint Louis Uni-
versity, University of Tulsa, and Washington University in St. Louis, which, 
like A&M, segregated their teams. By the end of 1951, another segregated 
institution, the University of Houston, was invited to join the league, which 
tilted the balance in favor of whites-only teams for the rest of the decade. In 
1957 Oklahoma A&M—by then, renamed Oklahoma State—would withdraw 
from the conference to join the Big Eight Conference.  
3. Minutes of the Athletic Council, 10/23/1951. Drake did not officially resign 
from the Missouri Valley Conference for another six weeks, but the decision 
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 That defense introduced a new dimension into intersectional 
play that called for much more than what the council termed “a 
mere reversal of the score.” Rather, when one professor sug-
gested that Drake cut its ties with A&M, Gardner roared that 
such a move was “the least Drake could do”: it could leave the 
league. If the southern members of the conference let Smith go 
unpunished, he posited, the violence destined to follow “en-
dangered” all of Drake’s black athletes—and their right to play. 
Better to resign the conference altogether than see this right as-
sailed by “that sort of sport.”4
 It was a radical step, taken by a group of unlikely radicals. 
All men, all white, all conservative midwesterners, the council-
men who packed Gardner’s office had just placed the honor of 
Drake’s black students—ones with extraordinary athletic abili-
ties, mind you—above all else, even football itself. “We acted in 
the only way we could,” argued one participant in the meeting, 
“and maintained the honor and tradition of Drake.” More than 
that, the hundreds of letters sent “from persons in all walks of 
life and from all parts of the country” signaled how “the move 
has had almost universal support.”5  
 Nowhere was that support more universal—or visceral—
than at home in Iowa. From Denison to Des Moines to Daven-
port, the incident represented, in the judgment of one group 
from Clear Lake, “a flagrant violation not only of football rules, 
but of human decency.” Every shutter-click of Ultang and Rob-
inson’s cameras exposed the competitive realities of southern 
football to Iowans caught unaware, opening their eyes, Ultang 
later observed, “to a social problem that hadn’t been recognized 
in the sports world” before Bright’s assault. “Suddenly,” he 
noted, “they found out a black man could be knocked around . . . 
deliberately.”6
                                                                                                       
to do so was made in this meeting. Concern for Drake’s other black athletes 
was well placed; there were five others besides Bright in its football program: 
Alfred Brown, Leslie Eddins, Noel Harris, Norm Johnson, and William Roberson. 
4. Minutes of the Athletic Council, 10/23/1951. 
5. Henry G. Harmon, Report of the President to the Drake University Board of 
Trustees, 12/14/1951, Folder “Bright, Johnny—Alum,” DBF. 
6. Brad Hughes et al. to Henry G. Bennett, 10/21/1951, folder 9, box 18, OSU 
Presidents Papers, 1908–1968, Special Collections and University Archives, 
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 This epiphany pushed football fans statewide toward the 
same conclusion as the councilmen: southern football was a 
world apart, governed by a resurgent degree of racial violence 
that in the postwar era proved, to the minds of one Des Moines 
husband and wife, “a travesty on our way of life.” Jim Crow 
never seemed so real for Iowans as he did in this moment. And 
his face was that of Smith, whose “gangster tactics and deliber-
ate ruthlessness” brought home the intolerance underlying seg-
regation for one Des Moines woman who lived near the Drake 
campus. Writing to Smith at his dormitory, she asked him, 
“Was your action stimulated by the fact that John Bright is a 
Negro?” But Iowans already knew the answer to that question. 
In the days following the game, stories circulated of white spec-
tators laying bets in the stands on how long it would take to in-
jure Bright. Compared to “Good Honest Football as played in 
Iowa,” alleged one group, this event revealed how the encom-
passing culture of southern football—players and fans alike— 
“didn’t have the courage to face the Drake squad with Johnny 
Bright playing, so they resorted to hoodlum tactics to get him 
out.” For a school superintendent in Spencer, the attack demon-
strated something far more fundamental about southern values. 
An individual who “ignores, condones, and alibis the disgrace-
ful act” seen in this game was, in his view, “afraid to take any 
constructive stand on the side of justice.”7
 When it came to football, at least, Iowans believed they 
were on the side of justice. Since the end of World War II, racial 
                                                                                                       
Oklahoma State University Libraries, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 
OK (hereafter cited as OSUPP); Ken Fuson, “Drake Great Johnny Bright Dead at 
53,” Des Moines Register, 12/15/1983. 
7. Mr. and Mrs. L. W. Matthews to Henry G. Bennett, 10/21/1951, folder 9, 
box 18, OSUPP; Mrs. A. J. Pesetski to Wilbanks Smith, 10/21/1951, ibid.; 
Anonymous (signed “Several Fans of Good Honest Football as played in 
Iowa”) to Henry G. Bennett, undated [10/22/1951], ibid.; W. F. Johnson to 
Henry G. Bennett, 10/23/1951, folder 10, ibid. Drake fans who attended the 
game in Stillwater, or heard from those who had, recounted the betting that 
took place in the stands and the rumors swirling through the A&M campus 
before kickoff about how the home team intended to harm Bright early in the 
first half. See, generally, J. M. Flynn to J. B. Whitworth, 10/25/1951, folder 10, 
box 18, OSUPP; and “Material Presented by Jack McClelland, Director of 
Athletics, before the Missouri Valley Conference Investigating Committee,” 
undated typescript [November 1951], folder “Bright, Johnny—Alum,” DBF. 
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reconciliation through gridiron competition was a facet of the 
college game that Iowa’s pigskin enthusiasts considered an in-
violable proposition. So was the guaranteed right to play. “As 
long as they are members of an Iowa team,” insisted the Cedar 
Rapids Gazette in March 1950, black athletes should “have the 
right to play with it wherever it appears and that right should 
never be signed away” in a game contract “with an opponent 
which refuses to compete against Negroes.”8  
 This unswerving determination that every athlete should be 
free to compete, regardless of race, was the animating principle 
of a wider activism that swept the landscape of college football 
in the state of Iowa in the five years between the first postwar 
season of 1946 and Bright’s assault in 1951. Iowans of all stripes 
advocated the elimination of the competitive color line, and, 
for a time, it looked as if they might do it. Progress expanded on 
the demands of average fans that their state’s brand of football 
stand for more than mere wins and losses. “It is my sincere be-
lief,” a booster in Spencer told Paul Brechler, athletics director 
at the University of Iowa, “that colleges and universities, above 
all other places, should be free of bigotry.” Such idealism reck-
oned with harsher truths that afternoon at Oklahoma A&M. 
“It is not easy,” Frank Gardner keened, “to watch dreams die as 
a result of foul play.”9
 An avatar of these dreams, Bright embodied for Iowans the 
promise of racial progress before his attack as surely as he did 
the loss of it thereafter. His injury brought down the curtain on 
a half-decade of reform, a bitter end to the widespread notion 
that Jim Crow could be licked by sport alone, while presaging a 
darker resistance to the sort of racial equality that Iowans cham-
pioned. From that point forward, argued a Guthrie Center man, 
Iowans would harbor “a marked distaste” for all teams southern, 
                                                 
8. “Where Foresight Counts,” Cedar Rapids Gazette, 3/5/1950, clipping in 
folder “No. 93, 1949–1950,” box 250, Virgil M. Hancher Papers, University of 
Iowa Archives, University of Iowa, Iowa City (hereafter cited as UIA). 
9. Paul Cooksey to Paul W. Brechler, 11/22/1950, folder “No. 84-89, 1950–
1951,” box 270, Hancher Papers; Frank N. Gardner, “Preliminary Statement to 
the Missouri Valley Conference Investigating Committee,” undated typescript 
[November 1951], folder “Bright, Johnny—Alum,” DBF (hereafter cited as 
Gardner Statement). 
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which they reflexively regarded as defenders of Jim Crow and 
the values that precipitated this violence.10
 Their anger and action in the aftermath of the Bright incident, 
however, cannot be fully comprehended without first coming 
to terms with their optimism and organization for lasting racial 
change in the years before this game. The striking synchronicity 
of campus activism, public opinion, and institutional policy dur-
ing this period already concluded segregation to be a moral, 
cultural, and competitive evil sharply at odds with the demo-
cratic values they believed their racially diverse teams repre-
sented in every contest. Where administrators presumed that 
the black athlete’s ability to compete in every game qualified as 
a defense of democratic values, other Iowans would hold that 
such values should be advocated on and off the field. “We dif-
fer only in our approach to the same problem,” noted Virgil M. 
Hancher, president of the University of Iowa. In this way, the 
galvanic response to the Bright incident brought together the ele-
ments of this activism, bonding them so as to render the equality 
of each competitor—as athlete and man—a touchstone of justice 
on the gridiron in Iowa.11
 This article explores how those “guarantees of justice,” in 
Gardner’s phrase, evolved in the world of Iowa football. Iowans 
embraced racial equality on the gridiron in this postwar period 
as the embodiment of democratic values, and they saw sports, 
generally, as a vehicle for combating the broader problems of 
racism in American life. However, the Bright incident demon-
strated the white South’s continued determination to resist such 
efforts, thereby raising questions about the extent to which 
sports could engender cultural transformation. Plotting Bright’s 
assault along a longer arc of Iowa’s own racial history shows 
how interracial play articulated homegrown competitive sensi-
bilities that would distinguish Iowa’s college teams for the in-
tentionality of black participation. Interracial play was an act 
made revolutionary by Iowans’ insistence on these guarantees, 
signaling how this overwhelmingly white state came to see, as 
the Drake Times-Delphic observed in 1947, that “race . . . has no 
                                                 
10. R. Y. Taylor to Henry G. Bennett, 10/22/1951, folder 9, box 18, OSUPP. 
11. Virgil M. Hancher to Doris M. Morgan, 12/26/1950, folder “No. 84-89, 1950–
1951,” Hancher Papers.  
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bearing on capabilities.” The refusal of their southern opposition 
to adopt a similar definition on the gridiron convinced Drake, 
Iowa, and Iowa State to retreat from competition compromised 
by racism. If that transformation could not be effected in the 
South, then these institutions would initiate it at home, putting 
their nondiscrimination principles into practice. It was a legacy, 
Gardner concluded, that demonstrated how “this affair is about 
something bigger than John Bright.”12  
 
ON THE SAME DAY that Drake’s Athletic Council met to 
consider its response to Bright’s attack, James H. Foster, an un-
dergraduate at the University of Iowa, sat down behind a desk 
in the Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity house and, in longhand, “con-
temptfully” [sic] composed a letter to Oklahoma A&M presi-
dent Henry G. Bennett. Foster had grown up in Des Moines, 
mere blocks from the Drake campus; friends from his Roosevelt 
High days were now Bright’s classmates. Bright’s assault proved 
more than a news event for him: it was personal. He was not 
alone. “As it is,” he told Bennett, “Oklahoma A&M has gained 
225,000 enemies in Des Moines, 2,750,000 in Iowa, and countless 
others across the country.” For every last one of them, “there is 
no doubt but that the incident was planned,” a searing lesson in 
Jim Crow values. “I realize that you and your fellow Southern-
ers hold Negroes in contempt,” he observed. “While we don’t 
associate with them socially in Iowa, we show respect and ad-
miration where they are due.” The “amazing” outpouring of 
support among “students here at the University of Iowa [who] 
have rallied behind Drake” showed Bright to be a man worthy 
of just such esteem. All that Bennett’s team earned was “dis-
grace.” For Foster, “the great spirit and exceptional sportsman-
ship of Southern and Southwestern football teams” was forever 
shown to be a fraud. After this event, he informed Bennett, “I 
now feel only hate for your brand of football.”13  
                                                 
12. Gardner Statement; “We Can Help Erase Racial Discrimination,” Drake 
Times-Delphic, 11/21/1947.  
13. James H. Foster to Henry G. Bennett, 10/23/1951, folder 9, box 18, OSUPP . 
Foster was not inflating the outrage on his campus over the Bright incident. 
On the same day as his letter was written, the Daily Iowan ran an editorial, 
directly beneath Ultang and Robinson’s photographs, that declared how “the 
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 The stark truths that came into focus in Ultang and Robin-
son’s photographs offered an even starker contrast for Iowans 
between the values of their home state and those of the South. 
“I can’t understand why your coach wanted to win your game 
enough,” Foster wrote Bennett, “that he would stoop to arrange 
the permanent injury of an All-American . . . by such foul means.” 
A writer for the Alton Democrat, on the other hand, thought such 
violence easily understood. “Bright was a colored boy and was 
playing football against a southern team” that knew that it “had 
to break [his] jaw” to win. Football in the South was, by his ac-
count anyway, “positively vicious.” One former Missouri Valley 
Conference football player from Cherokee was well acquainted 
with the tactics that southern teams deployed at will: “the dirti-
est, yellowest, meanest thing a white man can do—and this is 
especially true in the South on the home field before partisan 
fans—is to strike or deliberately foul a Negro on an opposing 
team.” A Des Moines salesman was not so sure that it was the 
players alone who derived pleasure from watching a black man 
beaten in public. He urged Bennett to take a second look at 
the photographs. “If, after looking at the pictures of the game, 
                                                                                                       
incident . . . concerns SUI in several ways,” not least of which was that “it hap-
pened in our backyard.” Because “Drake is an Iowa team,” there was “a per-
sonal meaning to the Bright incident”; “we cannot be indifferent to a neighbor’s 
house on fire.” The editorial called on the university’s student government to 
lodge a formal protest, but Student Council president John L. Bunce begged 
off in a letter to the Daily Iowan the next day. “For the University of Iowa to 
enter into this matter by way of a protest from the student body,” he main-
tained, “would be banal under these circumstances for the issue is not one in 
which we as a student body are engaged actively.” An incredulous sophomore 
responded, in his own letter to the Daily Iowan, “It is not only our responsibil-
ity, but our duty as students of SUI, to take an active interest in last Saturday’s 
football happenings in Oklahoma,” if only because “every man is his brother’s 
keeper.” The letters and telegrams collected in OSUPP include several written 
by students at the University of Iowa, but the student government did not 
formally protest the incident on behalf of its own constituents or in solidarity 
with Drake. See “The Bright Incident,” Daily Iowan, 10/23/1951; John L. Bunce 
to Editor, Daily Iowan, 10/24/1951; and John O. Seesser to Editor, Daily Iowan, 
10/26/1951. See also “Says Bright Not Purposely Hurt,” Daily Iowan, 10/23/ 
1951; Alfred M. Anderson to Editor, Daily Iowan, 10/24/1951; William I. Heth-
erington et al. to J. B. Whitworth, Daily Iowan, 10/24/1951; David R. Bowers to 
Editor, Daily Iowan, 10/24/1951; Stewart C. Crockett to Editor, Daily Iowan, 
10/26/1951; Phil Bigelow to Editor, Daily Iowan, 10/26/1951; and Dorothy T. 
Walker and Sam H. Walker to Editor, Daily Iowan, 10/26/1951. 
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you still insist on defending [Smith],” he argued, “you must 
be judged lacking in a sense of fair play just as Mr. Smith will be 
judged by all sports loving people throughout the country.” 
Studying the images for herself, one native Oklahoman living in 
Des Moines told Iowans to take heart. “As far as racial prejudice 
is concerned,” she crowed, Iowans “are at least 50 years ahead 
of Oklahomans.”14
 That was a shifting mark. Iowa was not the South—that 
much was true. But acceptance of free and unfettered black par-
ticipation in Iowa football was a decidedly postwar concept. 
Throughout the interwar seasons of the twenties and thirties, 
Iowa’s universities simply accepted racial violence as one of the 
unfortunate but unavoidable aspects of competition for black 
football players. “There’s no use kidding anyone,” remarked 
Ossie Solem, Iowa’s head coach in 1934, “a Negro player, even 
if his opponents play cleanly, always gets plenty of bumps and 
particularly when he is a star ball carrier.” His comments ad-
dressed the beatings his highly touted running back, Oze Sim-
mons, endured that season, especially at home against the Uni-
versity of Minnesota, whose whites-only team knocked Simmons 
cold twice. Minnesota president Lotus D. Coffman dismissed the 
widespread “inference” afterward “that the players on the Min-
nesota team were in someway or other antagonistic to Mr. Sim-
mons because he is a Negro.” Such an inference, he scoffed, was 
“silly and ought not to be given credence by thoughtful men.”15
 The recent past, however, showed other black players from 
Iowa having a rough go of it against the Golden Gophers. In a 
letter to himself on stationary from Minneapolis’s Curtis Hotel 
the night “before the first real college game of my life”—on Oc-
tober 6, 1923—Iowa State’s sophomore tackle, Jack Trice, held 
that no less than “the honor of my race, family, and self are at 
stake” in his performance against Minnesota. “Everyone is ex-
                                                 
14. Foster to Bennett, 10/23/1951; Chester R. Lindhoff to Henry G. Bennett, 
10/23/1951, folder 9, box 18, OSUPP; “It Seems to Us,” Alton Democrat, 10/25/ 
1951; Bob Reeser to Editor, Des Moines Register, 10/25/1951; Audrey Loehr to 
Editor, Des Moines Register, 10/25/1951. 
15. “Truth Out about Oze Simmons of Grid Fame,” New York Amsterdam News, 
11/17/1934; L. D. Coffman to H. D. Knox Jr., 11/5/1934, folder “Negro, 1921–
1936,” box 22, Office of the President Records, University Archives, University 
of Minnesota–Twin Cities, Minneapolis (hereafter cited as UMN). 
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pecting me to do big things,” he noted. “I will!” It was a pledge 
fulfilled with his life: a broken collarbone suffered in the first 
quarter augured sustained injuries in the second half, hastening 
his death two days later. One of his teammates, Harry Schmidt, 
denied rumors that Gopher players targeted him because of his 
race. “Absolutely not,” he told an interviewer in 1973. Yet the 
mere suggestion was enough to worry Big Ten commissioner 
John L. Griffith, who had been Drake’s head football coach from 
1908 to 1915. “Inasmuch as Mr. Trice was a colored man,” he 
wrote four days after Trice’s death, “it is easy for people to as-
sume that his opponents must have deliberately attempted to 
injure him.” Griffith’s own experience with “colored boys” im-
parted “very little to indicate that their white opponents had 
any disposition to foul them.” After all, he declared, “one of the 
great glories of athletics [was] that every man, no matter who 
he is, is assured fair play in an athletic contest.”16
 A lofty principle, no doubt, but hardly one to which univer-
sities in Iowa subscribed. Not only were black athletes like Trice 
and Simmons subjected to rough play from their opponents, but 
they also had to endure repeated blows to their dignity by their 
own universities concerning their right to play. They competed 
in an era dominated by so-called “Gentleman’s Agreements”— 
informal accords negotiated between northern and southern 
universities that sidelined athletes of color, all in the name of 
Jim Crow. To keep southern teams on their schedules, Iowa’s 
universities abided the color line, making an athlete’s race the 
qualifying factor for participation. 
 Indeed, had Trice lived another week, Iowa State leaders 
“had no intention of using” him in their game at the University 
of Missouri. On the day that he died, Mizzou athletics director 
C. L. Brewer contacted S. W. Beyer, Iowa State’s faculty athletic 
chair, about him. Unaware of the events in Minneapolis, Brewer 
                                                 
16. Jack Trice’s Last Letter, 10/5/1923, folder 8, box 1, Jack Trice Papers, Spe-
cial Collections and University Archives, Iowa State University Library, Ames 
(hereafter cited as ISU); Harry Schmidt, interview by Bill Walsh, 12/4/1973, 
folder 4, ibid.; John L. Griffith to S. W. Beyer, 10/12/1923, folder 7, ibid. On Jack 
Trice’s life and death, see Dorothy Schwieder, “The Life and Legacy of Jack 
Trice,” Annals of Iowa 69 (2010), 379–417. On the experience of black athletes in 
midwestern sports generally, see Charles H. Martin, “The Color Line in Mid-
western College Sports,” Indiana Magazine of History 98 (2002), 85–112.  
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Jack Trice (second from left) poses with three teammates in 1923. Photo 
courtesy University Archives, Iowa State University Library. 
reminded Beyer of “conditions here” in Columbia. “It is impos-
sible,” he explained, “for a colored man to play or even appear 
on the field with any team” from Mizzou. Mindful of southern 
“tradition,” he insisted, “we cannot permit a colored man on any 
team we play.” The color line was drawn. For his part, Beyer 
replied that Iowa State, as a fellow member of the Big Six Con-
ference, “understood for several years . . . that colored men 
could not be used on teams playing with schools from the states 
of Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma,” where Jim Crow ruled. 
Iowa State thus planned to leave Trice in Ames. “However,” 
Beyer noted, “that is all settled because Jack’s injury resulted in 
his death.”17
                                                 
17. S. W. Beyer to C. L. Brewer, 10/10/1923, folder 7, box 1, Trice Papers; C. L. 
Brewer to S. W. Beyer, 10/8/1923, ibid. Harry Schmidt claimed that Wash-
ington University had similarly drawn the color line for Iowa State’s game in 
St. Louis during the 1923 season. “Jack went with us,” he recounted, “but he 
got off the train at Kirksville [MO].” Schmidt alleged that teams in Missouri 
“would not play against a Negro”—a charge that Brewer’s letter here corrobo-
rates. However, Schmidt’s memory failed him: Iowa State did not meet Wash-
ington University until October 27, three weeks after Trice’s death. See Schmidt 
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 Although “no written rule” existed, “only a gentleman’s 
agreement,” Beyer nonetheless toed the color line. Succeeding 
generations of Iowa State leaders would do the same over the 
next quarter-century, abetting the divisions in the Big Six be-
tween integrated and segregated institutions. For the confer-
ence’s two southern members—Mizzou and the University of 
Oklahoma—the end of World War II intensified the need to 
codify these agreements in their bylaws. A wave of recently dis-
charged black veterans stood to flood onto campuses, and this 
pair had a vested interest in seeing that none of them crashed 
onto the gridiron. Accordingly, in May 1946, the president of 
Oklahoma’s Athletic Council, Walter Kraft, aided by his Miz-
zou counterpart, Sam Shirky, browbeat the other four faculty 
representatives—including H. D. Bergman of Iowa State—into 
approving, unanimously, a provision that they buried deep in-
side the Big Six rule book, written in such a manner as to ob-
scure its true intentions. “The personnel of athletic squads,” it 
read, “shall be determined in accordance with the laws of the 
sovereign state” in which the game was played, with “the per-
sonnel of visiting squads . . . selected as to conform with any 
restrictions imposed upon a host institution by the sovereign 
authority.” That is, black athletes were unwelcome in both Nor-
man and Columbia. Afterward, Kraft advised his president, 
George Lynn Cross, who personally opposed the state’s Jim 
Crow laws, that the “intense interest . . . in the negro question” 
compelled the action, to which, he boasted, “we all agreed.” 
This rule yielded the desired outcome. Kansas, Kansas State, 
Nebraska, and Iowa State simply avoided black recruits since 
they could not participate in every game. It was hardly a blow 
to the jaw, but this bylaw knocked black players out of Big Six 
games all the same.18
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 Kraft exerted such influence because the Big Six was a con-
ference run by faculty members. Regardless of the opposition of 
institution heads to this bylaw—whether Cross or Iowa State 
president Charles E. Friley, who were both against this rule 
change—they were powerless to stop it. Only those faculty 
leaders charged with managing Big Six business could affect 
its policy. Here, they encoded prejudice as their official com-
petitive stance. 
 The stoutest opposition to this provision was found among 
student leaders at the league’s institutions, including those at 
the University of Colorado, which joined as the league’s seventh 
member on New Year’s Day, 1948. The students took direct aim 
at the bylaw in hopes that the newly constituted Big Seven 
membership might turn the tide in favor of black participation. 
The groundswell had actually started with Iowa State’s student 
government, the Cardinal Guild, in November 1947. Its officers 
“reopened the question of discrimination,” the Daily Nebraskan 
reported, “by passing a resolution at their last meeting favoring 
equal opportunity for individuals, regardless of race, color, or 
creed to participate in the [league’s] athletic contests.” Led by a 
full spate of veterans, who believed that the bylaw violated the 
democratic values for which they had fought in Europe and the 
Pacific, the Cardinal Guild leaders presented their resolution to 
Bergman, who, they hoped, would lay their concerns before the 
faculty junta at the Big Seven’s winter meetings in Kansas City. 
“I told them I would do this,” he reported to Friley, “but doubted 
that the Conference would take any further action.” He was right. 
The matter was tabled at once.19
 The Cardinal Guild resolution did, however, succeed in ral-
lying students at other conference member institutions to action. 
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Harold Mozer, student body president at the University of Ne-
braska, asserted that “this year, with Iowa State behind us, we 
should be able to do something about the situation.” In late No-
vember 1947 Mozer welcomed Cardinal Guild president Don 
Delahunt to Lincoln along with the student government presi-
dents from four of the other five member institutions (Missouri’s 
president attended; Oklahoma’s did not) for a summit on this 
discriminatory rule. Their meeting produced a resolution similar 
to that of the Cardinal Guild: “any eligible student of a member 
institution shall be allowed to participate in all competitive ath-
letic events at any member institution.” A skeptical Daily Nebras-
kan editor sniped that Iowa State’s students had accomplished 
just one thing: “the proverbial sleeping dog was aroused.”20  
 Although the Big Seven’s faculty leaders rejected the joint 
student resolution at the same time as they tabled the one sent 
by the Cardinal Guild, the combined effect thawed the competi-
tive landscape. By March 1948, Iowa State’s athletics director, 
Louis Menze, was the first of his cohort to publicly entertain the 
notion of suiting up black players. “If we have any Negro boys 
come out, and they’re good enough,” he informed the Chicago 
Defender, “we’ll play them.” There was, however, one catch: 
“but not at Missouri and Oklahoma.” A month later, a student 
body referendum put Iowa State undergraduates on record as 
overwhelmingly in favor of lifting all bans on black participa-
tion in the Big Seven. Of 5,483 ballots cast, 5,062 (92 percent) 
favored repealing the bylaw, making them the first student 
body in the league to collectively voice support for opening 
athletic opportunities to African Americans.21
 Iowa State’s faculty and administrators did not share their 
courage. When, in early March, the institution heads of Colo-
rado, Kansas, Kansas State, Nebraska, and even Missouri held 
their own meeting about the bylaw, Friley deliberately ducked 
it. Nor did he sign the resolution those presidents and chancel-
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lors produced that called on “each institution [to] determine for 
itself what players are qualified” to play football.22
 By May, Oklahoma’s faculty senate recommended to Presi-
dent Cross that “any restrictions due to race in the participation 
of athletics at the University . . . be removed.” Yet Bergman 
joined with Kraft in holding the line on segregated competition, 
voting later that same month in the Big Seven’s spring meetings 
to keep that bylaw in the rule book. No one in a position of lead-
ership at Iowa State was willing, as Colorado president Robert 
Stearns put it, to “permit a change in official attitude.”23  
 If Stearns had had his way, such a change would have 
been patterned on what Drake and its Missouri Valley Confer-
ence brethren had achieved by erasing the color line from league 
play in late 1947. The members of that league, in the words of 
the Drake Times-Delphic, negotiated “far-reaching changes in 
rules governing athletic competition,” deciding that black ath-
letes could compete on all conference teams and in all confer-
ence venues, starting in September 1950, regardless of local laws. 
Stearns approved of this approach: segregated and integrated 
universities arriving at “such a modification in its rules” through 
mutual accord. To “disturb the present alignment” in the Big 
Seven required a similar understanding. With the likes of Saint 
Louis and Oklahoma A&M permitting black athletes from, say, 
Drake to play on their home fields, he figured, “it might be much 
easier for us to convince the University of Missouri and the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma of the desirability of change.”24
 Not every Missouri Valley member was convinced of this 
desirability, though. It was a deeply conflicted league, a mis-
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match of members who pursued radically divergent competitive 
ambitions—to say nothing of their varying cultural norms. Earle 
Davis, faculty athletics chair at the University of Wichita, was 
unsure whether the league could even “survive as a working 
and effective organization.” “We are far apart in many matters 
of principle,” he advised conference leaders in early 1947. “Some 
of us do not participate in various sports; some of us do not play 
other schools; some of us have wildly differing attitudes toward 
the conduct of sports.” Their concord on black participation, 
then, was an illusory kind of progress, suggesting that they 
were effecting real change, when, in fact, it was a last-ditch bid 
to save the conference from a seemingly inevitable dissolution.25  
 For their part, Drake officials would eventually blame this 
state of affairs on the “expansion of the conference to include 
schools from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico.” Straddling 
the Mason-Dixon Line in that way “has created numerous con-
ference problems,” not least of which was whether black par-
ticipation was a guaranteed right. After World War II, Drake 
and the other integrated members functioned competitively at 
odds with themselves: their black athletes could play segregated 
teams at home, but facing the Missouri Valley’s “Southern Bloc” 
on the road was impossible. “Southern inhospitality” was how 
the Drake Times-Delphic euphemistically characterized it. To wit, 
Perry Harris, Drake’s “fleet Negro back,” who returned to cam-
pus after 38 months in the Army Tank Corps in time for the 
1945 season, was left at home when his team departed for Okla-
homa and a showdown with the University of Tulsa. But when 
the series was renewed in Des Moines the following season, 
Harris’s coaches ruled him “available for the Tulsa tussle.” For 
Iowans, this situation was a perversion of morality, good sense, 
and fair play. For white Oklahomans, though, it was a natural 
condition of culture. “Colored boys,” stated one coach there, 
“are not allowed to play south of the Mason-Dixon line.”26
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 All of which helps explain why Johnny Bright’s appearance 
at Oklahoma A&M on October 15, 1949, was so groundbreaking. 
Never before had an African American played a team from 
Oklahoma inside its own state borders. Bright’s participation, as 
a sophomore, was a trial run for the new Missouri Valley rule. It 
was also a sop to the Big Seven, which A&M officials were des-
perate to join, as a show of racial tolerance for a conference that 
finally broke the color line that season when Kansas State used 
Harold Robinson on Thanksgiving Day against Mizzou in a 
game played in Columbia. It was “not practicable or feasible,” 
asserted Bergman, for the Big Seven to admit another segre-
gated member. Accordingly, Bright’s spot in Drake’s starting 
line-up demonstrated to skeptical Big Seven members that, al-
though A&M was a segregated team, Jim Crow did not deter-
mine its visitors’ rosters. On that afternoon, at least, black par-
ticipation in the state of Oklahoma became a guaranteed right.27
 Gardner would later recall the trepidation with which 
Drake officials approached the contest, worrying “how would 
this boy be treated” as “the first of his race to ever play on the 
Aggie field.” Bright was not quite the sensation he was when he 
returned to Stillwater in 1951, but, Gardner noted, “he was al-
ready attracting attention as the nation’s leading back”—which 
made him a ready target, no matter his race. The game was no 
contest, with a superior A&M team whipping Drake, 28–0. A 
reporter for the Drake Times-Delphic jibed that Bright and his 
teammates “were so well scouted that one got the idea that the 
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scouts had been working out with Drake since last August.” On 
the whole, Gardner confessed, “we were soundly trounced,” 
with Bright tallying his fewest rushing yards of the season, “but 
he was happy and we were made joyful by the fact that while 
the game was rough and tough, this boy was played clean.” In-
deed, Bright told his coaches that the A&M squad was “one of 
the cleanest he had played.” Afterward, Gardner drafted a letter 
to A&M leaders “to express our deep appreciation for the fine 
way in which this young back had been treated [by] the coach 
and members of the team.” Their “exemplary conduct” toward 
Bright proved to Drake officials that black athletes could com-
pete in the South without threatening their guaranteed right 
to play—and without violence. “Two years later,” Gardner ob-
served, ruefully, “the story was much different.”28  
 
AT THE DAWN of the 1950s, that story remained one of in-
creasing black participation in Iowa football—a refutation of 
Jim Crow values at home and in the South. “It is easier,” argued 
the Cedar Rapids Gazette in late February 1950, “to break down 
the fences of prejudice in sports than in other fields.” Bright ac-
complished that feat in Stillwater; Iowa State students demanded 
it in the Big Seven; now it was the University of Iowa’s turn.29  
 On a sultry Friday night in November, nearly 45,000 specta-
tors filed into Miami’s Orange Bowl Stadium to watch the unde-
feated Miami Hurricanes play host to a hapless Hawkeye team. 
The game would end much as this hometown crowd expected 
—in another Hurricane victory—but, early on, Iowa showed 
more fight than anyone had anticipated. Racing to a 7–0 lead on 
its first drive, Miami’s defense then faltered as Iowa quarterback 
Glenn Drahn hit a fluky 39-yard pass to Fred Ruck, hauled in 
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Sophomore fullback Bernie Bennett (#53 in dark jersey) scores a historic 
touchdown for the University of Iowa Hawkeyes against the vaunted 
Miami Hurricane defense. Photo from the 1951 Hawkeye yearbook. 
six yards shy of the Hurricanes’ goal line. On the next play, 
Drahn swept to his right, pitching off to sophomore fullback 
Bernie Bennett, one of five black players to suit up for Iowa, 
who skirted Hurricane right end Tom Jelley to slip in the front 
corner of the end zone for Iowa’s only touchdown. Bennett’s 
sprint marked another first—a black athlete scoring on Miami—
exactly what the 4,000 black spectators packed into the east 
stands paid to see. His touchdown, noted the Miami Herald, “in-
spired the Negro fans . . . to a wild cheer”—an unrestrainedly 
joyous expression of their racial pride. In his arms, Bennett cra-
dled all their ideals, hopes and aspirations as surely as the ball 
itself. His achievement was theirs.30
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 As with Bright’s experience in Stillwater the previous sea-
son, Bennett and his black teammates were surprised by the 
lack of violence. Judging it “a nice clean game,” Hawkeye head 
coach Leonard Raffensperger expressed appreciation for “how 
our colored boys were treated.” Given that most of the Hurri-
cane players were northerners, the reception the black athletes 
received was, to his mind, “no different than we expected.” 
After all, his team had just faced the least southern line-up it 
could meet this far below the Mason-Dixon Line. “We didn’t 
think those Miami boys from New York, Pennsylvania, or New 
Jersey,” he remarked, with a wink, “would mind playing against 
our boys.” This alone felt like progress—“a realization of the 
democratic ideal,” declared one black writer.31
 Yet the guaranteed right to play was not the guarantee of 
democratic ideals. Jim Crow made sure of that. From the start, 
every aspect of the contest reflected the vicissitudes of the seg-
regated South. In March, as he was finalizing the game contract, 
Iowa athletics director Paul Brechler explained to his president, 
Virgil M. Hancher, that their team’s black players were “a touchy 
problem” in Miami. Just weeks earlier, the University of Minne-
sota had conceded to local laws and left a black boxer at home 
for its bout there—a fact that made Brechler’s efforts to avoid 
“any embarrassment” an imperative. However he managed it, 
he arrived at “an understanding” with Miami athletics director 
Paul Harding about black participation: “if Iowa has Negroes 
on its squad”—as he knew it would—“there will be no question 
raised as their being permitted to represent our athletic depart-
ment.” With pride, Brechler told Hancher, “this will be the first 
time that Negroes have been granted permission to play against 
Miami” on its own field. To mark the occasion, Harding opened 
the east stands to black spectators, a one-time affair that not only 
cashed in on their interest, but at the same time effectively in-
creased segregation inside the Orange Bowl. One out of every 
ten tickets purchased went to a black patron, meaning a full 
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tenth of the crowd was seated in a section that existed for one 
purpose alone: to separate the races.32
 Back home, it was not who played or where spectators sat 
that concerned black Iowans, but the accommodations to which 
Bennett and his black teammates had been subjected. Before the 
Iowa team departed for Miami, Des Moines’s black newspaper, 
the Iowa Bystander, published an editorial blasting the university 
for a plan to house the team’s black players in private homes 
while its white players would stay in a swank downtown hotel. 
For the Bystander’s publisher, James B. Morris, it amounted to 
“a disgraceful arrangement, an insult to the Negro players.” To 
his thinking, the university had bowed to Jim Crow values—
and unnecessarily so. “Segregation is undemocratic and unfair,” 
he attested, “and places a stigma upon those who are objects of 
the unholy practice.” While social progress was achieved on 
the field, the black athletes were branded by segregation all the 
same with separate lodging. The university was at fault for fail-
ing to acknowledge how “it would be necessary to take a stand 
in this very matter” when it scheduled a game in a segregated 
city. Instead, he alleged, the university did nothing but open 
“the Hawkeye state to the justifiable criticism that it has entered 
into a mutual agreement to segregate and embarrass a portion 
of those who have been sent out as representatives of the insti-
tution.” In a personal letter, Morris appealed to Hancher to 
avoid any future games “requiring an arrangement of this kind.” 
“Out of decency, respect for the players, and in keeping with our 
boast of democracy,” he insisted, no Hawkeye team should 
travel south again “unless arrangements can be made which 
will not subject the players to this type of thing.”33
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 Hancher and Brechler were flabbergasted. It simply never 
occurred to them that their team was participating in anything 
but what Hancher labeled “an event of great social significance.” 
For them, the game was the thing—and, in this vein, they re-
garded their conduct before and during the trip to Miami as a 
defense, even an expansion, of the black athlete’s right to play. 
“We think we have played a large part,” Brechler told Morris, 
“in helping do away with segregation.” Iowa stood up to Jim 
Crow on the field and, even if its team lost the game, they still 
defeated him.34  
 Yet the victory extended only as far as the chalky in-lines of 
the gridiron itself. Beyond them, the black athletes were treated 
to the humiliating varieties of southern segregation. No matter 
how feverishly Brechler promised that the black players were 
“exceedingly well treated, and happy to have made the trip and 
played in the game,” the guaranteed right to play assumed di-
mensions that no Iowa university ever envisioned: overcoming 
segregation on the field was a hollow victory if black athletes 
were resegregated away from it. Ignoring the individual rights 
and dignity of black athletes, Morris argued in his Bystander 
column, “takes an unfair advantage of these players.” For black 
Iowans like him, this game marked no progress at all if the 
treatment of black players did not adhere to precepts of a demo-
cratic society. The university’s commitment to the guaranteed 
right to play for its black athletes, protested the Des Moines In-
terracial Commission, could not be compromised simply “to 
play an intersectional football game.” “Equality of accommoda-
tions,” they contended, “is a privilege to which each citizen is 
entitled if the principles of democracy are to be upheld.”35
 Like other universities throughout the state and the Midwest, 
Iowa was only then beginning to accord its black students the 
equality of accommodations that these activists demanded for 
black athletes. Those African Americans who applied to the 
University of Iowa in the thirties and forties discovered that 
their letters of acceptance were quickly followed by notices 
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from Housing Services, insisting that “the University of Iowa 
does not permit Negroes to live in any of our dormitories.” “Our 
Negroes,” they were informed, relied on Iowa City’s small black 
community for assistance. “They try to take care of their own,” 
one incoming freshman from Minneapolis was told in February 
1935. On their own, black men either rented beds in rooming 
houses or, as the Hawkeyes’ gridiron star Oze Simmons did, 
lived in one of the two black fraternity houses downtown on 
South Dubuque Street. Black women typically found lodging 
in the private residences of local black families or a privately 
owned dormitory operated by the Iowa Federation of Colored 
Women’s Clubs. The university would relent in this practice of 
segregation in 1946, when Housing Services assigned five black 
women to rooms in Currier Hall. For black men—especially ath-
letes—the policy change did not come until later that decade. 
Meanwhile, segregated housing remained a crisis on other cam-
puses around the state. In 1947 a pair of white undergraduates 
objected to a similar ban on black housing at Drake, pointedly 
asking in the Times-Delphic, “Is Drake a Jim Crow school?” But 
it was another two years before African Americans, like Johnny 
Bright, then a sophomore, could finally reside on campus.36
 Intersectional series only amplified the inherent contradic-
tions between principle and practice at Iowa’s major universities. 
None of these institutions perceived the dilemma in demanding 
equality for black athletes on the field but treating them like 
second-class citizens away from it. “Men in high places,” Morris 
wrote of the Hawkeyes’ trip, “should not agree to deny a citizen 
all the rights and privileges to which he is entitled under the 
law of the land.” But Iowa universities continued the practice 
anyway when their football teams took to the road. In 1951, 
when Bright and his teammates arrived in Stillwater for that 
fateful game with Oklahoma A&M, the hotel at which they 
                                                 
36. W. H. Cobb to W. T. Middlebrook et al., 9/29/1941, folder “Negroes, 1939–
42,” box 22, Office of the President Records, UMN; F. E. Holmes to Arnold B. 
Walker, 2/9/1935, folder “Negro, 1934–41,” box 10, Office of the Dean of Stu-
dents Records, UMN; Richard M. Breaux, “ ‘Maintaining a Home for Girls’: 
The Iowa Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs at the University of Iowa, 
1919–1950,” Journal of African American History 87 (2002), 236–55; William Green 
and Joe Massik to the Editor, Drake Times-Delphic, 11/26/1947; “Progress Re-
port,” Drake Times-Delphic, 2/25/1955.   
146      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
had stayed in 1949 now denied Bright a room. Without any 
lodging, Bright and Drake officials scrambled to find an alterna-
tive for him, which ended up being the private home of a local 
black minister—just the sort of segregated accommodations to 
which Morris had objected. Two years later, Iowa State’s first 
black players, Harold Potts and Hank Philmon, bunked in a 
black-owned funeral home the night before their junior varsity 
team took on Mizzou in Columbia. The precedent had been set, 
and ingrained, which caused Morris to lament that black players 
“should be a party to a deal of this kind.”37
 Yet off-field discrimination was irrelevant for most Iowa 
football fans. “It appears,” one booster apprised Brechler, “that 
the department is making every effort to combat prejudice and 
segregation where it is met”—especially if that meeting was on 
the gridiron. From the vantage of history, it is clear that, by the 
start of the 1950s, when Iowa’s universities entered into a series 
against a southern opponent, “stipulated from the beginning,” 
Hancher maintained, “was the condition that any Negro players 
. . . would play in the game.” Institution-to-institution relation-
ships in this matter required full agreement, he noted, or else 
the prospect of competition was “refused.” What happened off 
the field—as in lodging—did not bear upon whether the contest 
was scheduled. In this case, since hoteliers, not the University of 
Miami, had discriminated against the athletes, the University 
of Iowa, in Hancher’s telling, “did not cancel its contract with a 
University that did not discriminate because of the discrimina-
tion practiced by the hotel owners.” Socially segregating its black 
athletes from its white ones in a city governed by Jim Crow was 
merely the price to be paid, in his judgment, for helping inter-
racial play “become commonplace.” After all, this game, he 
averred, “moved another step toward the solutions we seek”—
namely, no forced disruptions in the services of its best players.38
                                                 
37. “Iowa Must Not Violate Its Pledge”; Jeff Olson, “50 Years Later: Reliving the 
Johnny Bright Story,” Des Moines Register, 10/13/2001; Ultang interview; Morris 
to Hancher, 11/14/1951. 
38. Cooksey to Brechler, 11/22/1950; Hancher to Morgan, 12/26/1950. There 
is evidence that the Iowa-Miami game did change the culture of southern foot-
ball, at least with regard to the University of Miami. By 1957, Miami president 
Jay F. W. Pearson could attest that his fans had become accustomed to watch-
ing integrated teams play the Hurricanes in the Orange Bowl. “Our public,” he 
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“LICKING THE PROBLEM of discrimination could be ac-
complished only by Negroes continuing to go into the South.” 
So answered a faculty member when Drake’s athletics director, 
Jack McClelland, asked the Athletic Council, in a meeting just 
ten days after Bright’s assault, “if we should subject” athletes 
of color to “the discrimination they invariably received in the 
South,” competitively and culturally. For McClelland, “the ques-
tion of continuing to play our men against schools in the South 
was one for serious consideration,” particularly when weighed 
against “the possibility of another ‘incident.’” “Sending teams 
to compete in the South” was, to his way of thinking, a chancy 
proposition, offering a definitive challenge to the university’s 
policy of “treating colored athletes the same as white ones.”39  
 McClelland’s concerns touched the heart of the problem: 
Was intersectional competition fair to black athletes? Despite 
the attack that their best player had just endured, these council-
men believed that traveling south was worth the risk, asserting 
—against overwhelming photographic evidence—that “the race 
problem in sports is considerably better than it was some years 
ago.” McClelland tempered his doubts by mouthing similar 
platitudes. “Perhaps the best thing about this entire incident,” he 
sighed, “was the help it might give in the lessening of racial dis-
crimination the country over.” Progress was happening in Iowa, 
no doubt. The question was whether the South would follow 
suit. From where McClelland was sitting, the violence in Okla-
homa made those odds long, indeed. He reminded the council-
men of “the sort of men Drake has to deal with in the Missouri 
Valley Conference—men who do not think as we do.” What’s 
more, he warned, “Drake has alienated most of the Conference 
schools.” Its offense? Seeking justice for an African American.40
                                                                                                       
told a presidential colleague, “does like to see teams from other major confer-
ences and other independents like Notre Dame and Pittsburgh.” The Hurricanes 
would not integrate their own football program until the mid-sixties, but in the 
meantime their fans did not object to racial diversity in their opponents’ rosters. 
See Jay F. W. Pearson to J. Wayne Reitz, 2/13/1957, folder “Correspondence, 
SEC, 1955–57,” box 54, J. Wayne Reitz Presidential Papers, Department of Spe-
cial and Area Collections, University of Florida, Gainesville. 
39. Minutes of the Athletic Council, 10/30/1951. 
40. Ibid. 
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 For the sort of men Drake had to deal with in its conference 
—the so-called Southern Bloc—no cause was more offending. 
They made it abundantly clear after Bright’s assault that they 
would shield Oklahoma A&M, in general, and Wilbanks Smith, 
in particular, from ever facing justice. Jim Crow would be de-
fended. For the Drake Athletic Council, the bloc “seemed to be 
pursuing a deliberate policy of procrastination” as a way to 
frustrate Drake’s determined drive to see Smith penalized. The 
bloc would stall hearings, cast aspersions on Drake’s motives, 
even accuse McClelland of selling doctored photographs to Des 
Moines newspapers. Worse yet, the chairman of the league’s 
investigating committee—a professor at Tulsa—informed Frank 
Gardner that, although “A&M had a pitifully weak case,” no 
punishment for Smith was imminent, ensuring that he would 
get away with assaulting Bright. So much for justice.41
 The Missouri Valley’s ultimate refusal to punish Smith not 
only incensed football fans across Iowa, but caused them to ap-
preciate, for the first time, how black participation in an age of 
Jim Crow was not about competition alone; it was also a matter 
of justice. The guaranteed right to play, the rights of black ath-
letes away from the field, the intersection of interracial play with 
principles of democracy—these aspects of the growth in diversity 
in Iowa football were implicated in the search for justice. The 
Missouri Valley membership, in the eyes of most Iowans, chose 
to forgive Smith but condemn Bright for being an outstanding 
athlete—and African American. “Such reprehensible and un-
sportsmanlike conduct and discrimination against a player 
because of color or outstanding ability as with Johnny Bright,” 
argued a Waterloo man, “cannot be shrugged off.” Yet that was 
precisely what the Southern Bloc would do, leaving Drake with 
what Gardner judged the “not very desirable alternative” of 
making good on its pledge to resign from the conference.42
 In one final appeal for Smith to be held to account, Drake 
president Henry Harmon attended a gathering of Missouri Val-
                                                 
41. Minutes of the Athletic Council, 11/16/1951, 10/30/1951. Oklahoma 
A&M athletics director Henry Iba claimed that McClelland was guilty of 
“showing pictures to the press.” 
42. D. B. Smith to Henry G. Bennett, 10/22/1951, folder 9, box 18, OSUPP; 
Minutes of the Athletic Council, 10/30/1951. 
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ley presidents in mid-November, where it was apparent that 
bloc members would withhold justice for Bright. When Harmon 
asked his presidential colleagues “if the Conference refused to 
condemn the incident,” they all answered that they planned 
to make no statements one way or another. Baffled, he then in-
quired “if they denied the legitimacy of Drake’s protest.” Again, 
they would stay silent. To a man, they confessed that Smith was 
guilty. “But,” Harmon reported to the Athletic Council, “they 
were still unwilling to act.” Privately, he confided in McClelland 
that Drake could never expect to receive any measure of justice 
from them. Far from leading league leaders to a moment of 
moral clarity, Bright’s attack offered “a fine opportunity for the 
Southern schools to reintroduce the ban on Negro athletes or for 
the Conference to create a situation that would force out some 
of the Northern schools.” Showing Drake the door would allow 
them to “swing the Conference to the South and the Southwest” 
and reestablish “a Conference that practices segregation”—an 
association sure to deny justice to athletes of color.43
 By that 1951 season, such a conspiracy no longer seemed far-
fetched. The sports pages were filled with stories of midwestern 
institutions dealing with the racism of their southern counter-
parts. The week of Bright’s assault featured two such items in-
volving Drake’s Missouri Valley brethren. Three days before 
Bright and his teammates traveled to Stillwater, wire reports 
carried news of the cancellation of a November 24 game be-
tween Bradley and Florida State, to have been played in Talla-
hassee. Despite the on-field progress made when black athletes 
from the University of Iowa played in Miami, Florida State offi-
cials declined Bradley’s request that its black players be guar-
                                                 
43. Minutes of the Athletic Council, 11/27/1951; Memorandum, Henry G. Har-
mon to Jack McClelland, 11/15/1951, folder “Bright, Johnny— Alum,” DBF. 
There was some credence to Harmon’s allegations about the desire of the 
Southern Bloc to transform the Missouri Valley into a segregated, southern 
conference. In May of that year, the Southern Bloc had attempted to expand 
the league membership to include another of their ilk, Texas Tech. “In case of a 
dissenting vote on the part of the northern schools” about Texas Tech’s appli-
cation, the Daily Oklahoman reported, “a bloc of southern schools in the Valley 
might pull away and form a loop of their own with Texas Tech as a member.” 
No doubt, Harmon would have been aware of Texas Tech’s application and 
the divisions it laid bare in the conference. See “Valley Gathers, Deny League 
Split Rumor,” Daily Oklahoman, 5/11/1951. 
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anteed a right to play, hastily pulling the plug on this date as 
well as on their return engagement in Peoria, Illinois, in 1952. 
Bradley athletics director A. J. Bergstrom was unapologetic. 
“If these four men can’t participate,” he insisted, “neither can 
the rest of the Bradley team”—a natural position, given the Mis-
souri Valley’s own rules.44  
 Yet the Daily Oklahoman considered southern teams willing 
to use “deliberate mayhem” to win. A renewed campaign to 
marginalize and brutalize black athletes was essential to their 
project of unscrupulous success, witnessed that Saturday in 
Stillwater—and in Tulsa. There, rough treatment of Marquette 
University’s black players by Tulsa’s entire team prompted both 
institutions to terminate contracts for their future meetings. The 
Daily Oklahoman believed that the world of southern football, 
“tainted with thuggery,” was drifting further from the national 
mainstream, with Ultang and Robinson’s photographs illustrat-
ing the distance. “Some of our Southwestern institutions,” one 
Des Moines salesman mourned, “must ‘win at all costs.’”45
 Rough play was one thing. But the spirit of the play in Still-
water—a concerted effort not just to limit Bright’s effect, but to 
take him out—went well beyond hard-nosed competition, a fact 
impressed upon the Drake team throughout their trip. One 
player, George Smith, visited a local barber shop, where the pa-
trons “bet a certain amount of money that John Bright would not 
finish the game.” Another of Bright’s teammates, Jim Peterson, 
was told by a scared A&M student that head coach J. B. Whit-
worth had prodded his players in practice all week “to take care 
of John Bright, whatever it takes, even if you have to kill him.” 
Multiple players and coaches heard rumors that Whitworth’s 
assistants made the slogan for that week’s practice simple: “Get 
Bright.” Other stories told of these assistants screaming at play-
ers in defensive drills to “get that nigger” or “get that coon.”46
 Whatever was said or done in practice, Gardner believed it 
“extremely important to find the source of this intent.” He urged 
                                                 
44. “Bradley Game Cancelled,” New York Times, 10/18/1951; “This Is 1951, 
Boys!” Baltimore Afro-American, 10/27/1951. 
45. “This Hurts All Oklahoma,” Daily Oklahoman, 10/26/1951; Lindhoff to 
Bennett, 10/23/1951.  
46. Warren Gaer Statement, 10/23/1951, folder “Bright, Johnny—Alum,” DBF. 
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the Missouri Valley’s investigating committee to focus its inquiry 
on what factors influenced Smith to act as he had. “If he is a mild 
person,” as A&M officials said he was, “the provocation to in-
tent must have been all the more intense and strong.” Whitworth 
and his staff either “directly or indirectly instilled in him pre-
game ideas,” but “were their slogans and ‘battle cries’ of such 
a nature that a ‘mild young man’ goes suddenly berserk on the 
very first scrimmage play of the game?” Smith’s intent had a 
source, but the southern members hardly wanted to find it.47  
 To pinpoint what prompted Smith to attack Bright would 
have meant traversing the gulf that was opening, not just be-
tween Drake and its southern opponents, but between the val-
ues of equality and access, which Iowa football fans believed to 
be hallmarks of this postwar age, and a closed and provincial 
southern society, encumbered by its fealty to Jim Crow. The 
Bright incident suggested that southern values were so inher-
ently racist that its universities and their teams could not be 
trusted to know the right thing, let alone do it. It was a failure of 
institutions, cultural and educational. This assault, then, was, for 
one Drake fan, not only an “unsportsmanlike act”—it was also 
“un-American.” That feeling suffused the outrage. “There are 
many here in Iowa and the Middlewest,” KRNT sports director 
Al Coupee reported, “who are convinced that Smith attacked 
Bright in violation of every principle of American sportsman-
ship.” There was no need to play an opposing team that could 
not be trusted to play fairly, or whose “type of play,” Gardner 
asserted, “destroys the very canons of normal human decency.”48
 Decency was never Jim Crow’s calling card: violence, misery, 
heartbreak—that was more his style. Drake and its supporters 
—and, of course, Bright himself—had more than their fill of his 
manner, his values, his influence over an athlete who was in 
thrall to the cruelty of prejudice, whose actions, Harmon told 
Drake’s board of trustees, were “below the whole intent and 
purpose of the game.” The university, he said, should have no 
affiliation with a conference that “hesitated to take any action 
                                                 
47. Gardner Statement. 
48. J. Stuart Kirk to Henry G. Bennett, 10/24/1951, folder 9, box 18, OSUPP; 
Al Coupee, “Letter to Aggie Head,” Drake Times-Delphic, 10/26/1951; Gardner 
Statement.  
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against the Oklahoma school because it believed that the college 
would ignore any action that was taken.” Nor should Drake 
associate with institutions that deliberately refused to accept 
that Bright’s injuries were, in Gardner’s phrasing, “intentional 
beyond reasonable doubt.” With no punishments forthcoming, 
with Smith continuing to play as if nothing had happened, with 
Bright’s brilliant college career cut tragically short, Drake’s Ath-
letic Council was left with no other recourse than to fulfill its 
pledge. On November 27, 1951, Drake resigned its membership 
in the Missouri Valley Conference. In solidarity, Bradley ten-
dered its notice as well. With the Universities of Wichita and 
Detroit the only remaining northern schools, the Missouri Val-
ley was now a southern conference, by right. “Alas,” Bradley’s 
faculty athletic chair, Philip Becker Jr., wrote to Gardner, “the 
villain has stolen the scene.”49
 
WHEN WORD of Drake’s resignation circulated through cam-
pus, reported the Times-Delphic, students “overwhelmingly” sup-
ported the move. Seeing few alternatives, most of them echoed 
the proud insistence of one upperclassman that pulling up stakes 
and moving on was “the only thing we could do.” A brother in 
the Alpha Tau Omega fraternity guaranteed a repeat of the vi-
olence inflicted on Bright if Drake stayed put, given the Mis-
souri Valley’s indifference to the motivations behind his assault. 
“If nothing was done,” he postulated, “this type of situation 
could just keep happening.” And then there was the matter of 
Bright’s honor. “We should withdraw,” asserted one of the star 
player’s senior classmates, “in respect to John Bright alone—
who did so much and expected so little.” Still, no matter how 
strongly they felt that this stand was made on principle, stu-
dents fretted about the prospects for Drake’s “Bright-less” fu-
ture as an independent. “I think the action was justified,” con-
fessed one Kappa Kappa Gamma sorority member, “but I don’t 
think we’ll be having any good games any more.”50  
                                                 
49. Harmon, Report to Drake Board of Trustees, 12/14/1951; Gardner Statement; 
Philip Becker Jr. to Frank N. Gardner, 12/4/1951, folder “Bright, Johnny—
Alum,” DBF. 
50. “Students Support University Action Against Valley,” Drake Times-Delphic, 
11/30/1951. The Times-Delphic polled 45 students: 29 favored Drake’s departure  
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Drake University’s withdrawal from the Missouri Valley Conference was 
the subject of four of the top five stories on the front page of the November 
30, 1951, issue of the Drake Times-Delphic. Image courtesy of Cowles 
Library Archives, Drake University. 
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 She was more right than she could ever know. Trading profit 
for principle meant that Drake’s independence from 1952 to 1956 
lacked the drama of a conference championship race or the na-
tional spotlight of a star player. Fans lost interest as Drake en-
dured one losing season after another, leaving Drake Stadium 
embarrassingly empty during home games. By 1954, the foot-
ball program’s operating deficit was upwards of $20,000, a 
crushing sum for a university that depended on gameday reve-
nue. “Very anxious to get in a conference,” President Harmon 
pressed Gardner and McClelland to secure a new league affilia-
tion, which, by September 1955, they found, improbably, in the 
Missouri Valley. A unanimous vote of the league members—
including Oklahoma A&M—ushered Drake back into the fold, 
an acknowledgment of what both sides had lost in the Bright 
incident. Drake needed its rivalries with Wichita, Tulsa, and 
Bradley (which resumed its membership in 1955 as well) to in-
crease gate receipts. The Missouri Valley needed its traditional 
northern anchor. Bygones could be bygones, in Gardner’s view, 
if it might “stimulate attendance.”51
Yet by the time that Drake made its prodigal return, the Mis-
souri Valley was hardly the same conference. Southern members 
still dominated, yes, but the guaranteed right to play for black 
athletes was standing policy, in large part because their own 
football programs were now integrated. The composition of 
those southern teams on Drake’s regular season schedules be-
fore and after the Bright incident indicates just such a transforma-
mation (see table). Where Drake had routinely faced segregated 
foes in the six seasons prior to its withdrawal—in some years, 
playing as many as four whites-only squads on a slate of nine 
games—in the post-Bright era it never competed against op-
ponents who toed the color line, even as the resumption of its 
Missouri Valley membership in 1957 returned the university to 
sustained contact with the world of southern football. Its teams  
                                                 
from the Missouri Valley Conference; 3 believed that Drake could simply stop 
playing Oklahoma A&M, while maintaining its conference membership; only 
12 opposed the university’s resignation outright. 
51. Harmon, Report to Drake Board of Trustees, 12/14/1951; “Drake To Keep 
Football—Harmon,” Drake Times-Delphic, 1/12/1954; “Drake Resumes Mis-
souri Valley Status,” Drake Times-Delphic, 9/14/1955. 
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were not facing the racially hostile likes of Oklahoma A&M, but,  
rather, North Texas State, which, in signing two African Ameri-
cans, Abner Haynes and Leon King, to football scholarships in 
1956, kept pace with the kinds of competitive change that en-
abled Drake to reenter conference play without violating its 
stand against Jim Crow. Indeed, Drake’s first trip below the 
Mason-Dixon line since that day in Stillwater was made to 
Denton, Texas, on October 5, 1957, to meet Haynes, King, and 
their North Texas teammates. (Drake would win, 19–6.) The 
regularity of black participation on the Drake squad, as well as 
on nearly all of the other league teams, revealed to the North 
Texas coaches, explained historian Ronald E. Marcello, that “re-
cruiting other blacks in future years” was critical if their own 
program “were to remain competitive” in the Missouri Valley. 
It was an epiphany that guaranteed that Drake would be facing 
more Abner Hayneses and fewer Wilbanks Smiths.52
                                                 
52. Ronald E. Marcello, “The Integration of Intercollegiate Athletics in Texas: 
North Texas State College as a Test Case, 1956,” Journal of Sport History 14 (1987), 
286–316, esp. 309. The use of black athletes throughout the Missouri Valley Con-
ference expanded in the late fifties and early sixties, except at the University 
of Tulsa. Although Tulsa allowed visiting African Americans to compete on its 
home field, there is evidence of fan abuse, even into the early sixties. Indeed, 
when Drake’s basketball team played there in early 1964, Tulsa fans hurled ice 
and racial epithets at Drake’s black players. “It is a shame,” railed the editor of 
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 Drake’s guarded reengagement with southern football 
mirrors generally the experiences of the University of Iowa and 
Iowa State, whose schedules indicated a similar reluctance after 
1956 to square off against opponents who insisted upon segre-
gation. Although Iowa State continued to face Missouri and 
Oklahoma’s whites-only squads in Big Seven play until 1956, 
both institutions had long abandoned their opposition to black 
participation, clearing the way, by the early 1950s, for African 
Americans to join Cyclone football for the first time since World 
War II. The same was true at Iowa. The Hawkeyes, for instance, 
began their 1958 national championship season with Texas Chris-
tian, whose tolerance for African Americans on its opponents’ 
rosters was recognized across the Midwest. “Laest yeah,” one 
Texan explained to the Daily Iowan, which lampooned his ac-
cent, “weal whupped Ohiah Staet an lost ah owun confrurence 
titul, so this yeah weal lost to Ahiowah and weal going to win 
tha Saouthwes titul.” Black players or not, “ouah boys wun’t 
wurried abah this game.” Perhaps they should have been more 
concerned about Iowa’s black stars, such as Bob Jeter, who reeled 
off a 42-yard touchdown run, or John Burroughs, whose strong 
tackling helped to keep them out of the end zone all day.53
 Texas Christian was the first southern university that Iowa 
had played since the Bright incident, which Iowa athletics direc-
tor Paul Brechler had denounced at the time in a letter to Drake’s 
Athletic Council. Because of his “indignation” at Bright’s treat-
ment, he refused to slate southern opposition. Similarly, Iowa 
State faculty athletics chair H. D. Bergman would contest Okla-
homa A&M’s admission to the Big Seven for another five years. 
After Bergman persuaded Colorado and Nebraska to join with 
Iowa State in defeating A&M’s expansion bid in December 1954, 
                                                                                                       
the Times-Delphic, “that such a great basketball conference as the Missouri Val-
ley has to be ruined by a team that bases a game on bigotry and intolerance.” 
“Is It All in the Game?” Drake Times-Delphic, 3/3/1964. 
53. Lou Younkin, “Iowa Hawkeyes Favored Over TCU Horned Frogs Today,” 
Daily Iowan, 9/27/1958; “Post-Game Comments,” Daily Iowan, 9/30/1958. 
Iowa’s three southern opponents in the post-Bright era—Texas Christian in 
1958, North Carolina State in 1965, and the University of Miami in 1966—each 
fielded all-white teams when they played the Hawkeyes. However, these insti-
tutions were well known for agreeing to interracial play and did not make the 
participation of Iowa’s black athletes an issue in scheduling their games. 
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Kansas chancellor Franklin Murphy consoled A&M president 
Oliver Willham with the promise that “it is only a matter of time” 
before their institutions would be conference colleagues. How-
ever, one Oklahoma City sportswriter counseled disappointed 
A&M fans that a Big Seven invitation was inconceivable so 
long as Iowa State could play up “sympathy” for Bright.54  
 When A&M was finally granted membership in 1957, its 
athletics director and head basketball coach, Henry Iba, pledged 
“to bring our athletic program in stride with the Conference.” 
That meant bringing African Americans into its segregated pro-
gram, for Missouri and Oklahoma had integrated their teams by 
that time. It would be another three years, in September 1960, 
before the newly styled Oklahoma State program made its Big 
Eight Conference debut—a delay demanded by Iowa State to 
guarantee that this newest member did indeed recruit athletes 
of color into its football program. An integrated league would 
abide segregation no more.55
 
SUCH PROGRESS made on the field did not ensure progress 
away from it. Just because the color line was being erased from 
the gridiron did not mean that Iowa universities were scrubbing 
it clean from their own campuses. “Since we know that our fine 
University Community of Ames is blighted by prejudice,” a lo-
cal minister remarked in 1963, the first step to eradicating this 
scourge was to stop “pretending it does not exist.” After all, he 
asserted, “in the Midwest, we are tempted to believe that we are 
isolated from the problems of racial discrimination.”56
                                                 
54. Minutes of the Athletic Council, 10/23/1951; Flynn to Whitworth, 10/25/ 
1951; Franklin D. Murphy to Oliver S. Willham, 1/5/1955, folder “Athletic 
Office, 1954–55,” box 1, series 2/11/5, Chancellor’s Office Records, Kenneth 
Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas Libraries, University of Kan-
sas, Lawrence. 
55. H. P. Iba to Franklin D. Murphy, 5/20/1957, folder “Athletic Office, 1956–
57,” box 1, series 2/11/5, Chancellor’s Office Records; Volney Meece, “Big 
Seven Officials Again Reject Cowpokes,” Daily Oklahoman, 12/12/1954. Chester 
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56. Russell L. Fate to Editors of the Daily Tribune and Iowa State Daily, 1/29/1963, 
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 That illusion of a color-blind society was enough to persuade 
at least one black student to attend Iowa State. When a young 
freshman from Charleston, South Carolina, named Harvey Gantt, 
enrolled there in the fall semester of 1960, he learned immediately 
that it was “really a considerably different place than I had 
thought it would be.” There were few black students. “In fact,” 
he recalled in 1986, “there weren’t many blacks anywhere.” 
Prevented by segregation from attending Clemson Agricultural 
College, Gantt, using his National Merit Scholarship and funds 
from a state-sponsored program to pay for African Americans 
to study outside South Carolina, enrolled at Iowa State to major 
in architecture. It was not the prospect of studying architecture, 
however, that had lured him to Ames. Rather, he confessed, “I 
was mesmerized by the big-time college football” that the Cy-
clones played “and seeing so many black athletes and assuming 
that the schools [in the Midwest] were a lot more integrated 
than they were.” The “complicated” reality for African Ameri-
cans at Iowa State was that “very few blacks matriculated . . . 
and those that did were primarily athletes.” So pervasive was 
this reality, Gantt recalled, that most of the white students he 
met in his first days on campus “assumed that I was playing on 
the football team, which insulted me and was degrading.”57
 When Gantt finally won admission to Clemson in federal 
court in late January 1963, he was reminded “how different that 
was immediately from Iowa State”: the janitors at Clemson were 
black. Although he was the first African American to enroll in 
a traditionally white university in the state of South Carolina 
since the age of Reconstruction, Gantt was not the only person 
of color on campus, for Clemson was populated by a network 
of black service workers who told him that “we’re going to take 
care of you.” “As a matter of fact,” he noted, “Clemson turned 
out to be blacker” than Ames, which he had expected to be 
more open and fair than the South because it allowed minorities 
to play football. The presence of black athletes on Iowa’s foot-
ball teams masked those deeper problems of discrimination in 
student life at Iowa’s universities, which blinded administrators 
                                                 
57. Harvey B. Gantt, interview by Lynn Haessly, 1/6/1986, Interview C-0008, 
Southern Oral History Program Collection, Southern Historical Collection, Wil-
son Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill. 
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to the challenges still facing black students, and called into ques-
tion the nature of an integrated university.58
 The confluence of those dilemmas was seen in October 1961 
on the Daily Iowan’s editorial page. When its editors reprinted a 
column from the Daily Texan, the student newspaper at the Uni-
versity of Texas, calling for the recruitment of African American 
athletes to its own football team, one Iowa student reminded 
his fellow Hawkeyes that “unfortunately, we . . . are in no posi-
tion to be smug.” “Yes,” he conceded, “we have permitted Ne-
gro athletes to perform in sports events.” In fact, “we are willing 
to spare no expense to encourage their participation.” Never-
theless, there was still work to be done at Iowa. African Ameri-
cans were not permitted to join the university’s all-white Greek 
system. Nor did the university defend the rights of black stu-
dents to live in off-campus housing without facing discrimina-
tion from local landlords. For that matter, its officials were slow 
to acknowledge any complaint of discrimination on campus—a 
tell-tale sign, for this student, that issues of racial progress pos-
sessed a relevance beyond the brick walls of Iowa Stadium. “The 
antebellum attitude at Texas U. has, at least, the virtue of consis-
tency,” he jibed. “Ours, on the other hand, is a curiously un-
principled code”—a code, that is, that conveyed to Iowa’s black 
students that “you can participate FOR us—but not WITH us.”59
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 That this editorial dustup arose ten years to the month since 
the Bright incident indicated the endurance of these matters 
long “after the heat of the battle,” as Harmon described it to 
Gardner. The gridiron supplied a frame for white Iowans in 
which the essential values of a democratic society—fair and 
open access to opportunity, rewarded ability, social progress 
through education—could be defended, if not expanded, by the 
competitive ambitions of their universities’ football programs. 
When asked to break this frame and consider the applicability 
of these values to their everyday lives, white Iowans proved 
generally incapable of translating such advocacy to a world 
beyond the gridiron. By contesting Jim Crow’s influence over 
football in the segregated South, they were given license to 
overlook his cruel handiwork at home. “Racial prejudice exists 
in Des Moines,” observed Patti Miller, a Drake student who 
would participate in the Mississippi Freedom Summer of 1964. 
“People are killing and beating others with their thoughts.” 
Except, by the mid-sixties, Iowans did not need to look for this 
violence—physical or psychic—in Oklahoma, but in “the white 
backlash” that Miller saw materializing in her hometown and 
on her own campus toward the approaching reckoning with 
Jim Crow. To defeat the values of segregation once and for all, 
Iowans of all stripes would have to take a stand in the interests 
of progress as surely as they had for pigskin. “Now,” Miller 
concluded, “we have something to fight.”60  
                                                 
60. Henry G. Harmon to Frank N. Gardner, 12/5/1951, folder “Bright, Johnny 
—Alum,” DBF; Jane Bartley, “Views Racial Situation after Mississippi Project,” 
Drake Times-Delphic, 9/25/1964. In my conclusions here on the intersections 
between civil rights and life in postwar Iowa, I have been most influenced by 
my readings of Noah Lawrence, “ ‘Since it is my right, I would like to have it’: 
Edna Griffin and the Katz Drug Store Desegregation Movement,” Annals of 
Iowa 67 (2008), 298–330; George William McDaniel, “Catholic Action in Dav-
enport: St. Ambrose College and the League for Social Justice,” Annals of Iowa 
55 (1996), 239–72; and Katrina M. Sanders, “The Burlington Self-Survey in 
Human Relations: Interracial Efforts for Constructive Community Change, 
1949–1951,” Annals of Iowa 60 (2001), 244–69.  
